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Abstract: This paper discusses the growth and transformation of microfinance
organizations (MFO) in India. Issues that have triggered transformation include
size, diversity, sustainability, focus, and taxation. Transformation experiences in
India are few. To move to the mainstream, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) choose from three popular forms of organizations: non-banking finance
companies (NBFCs), banks, and cooperatives. It appears that there is no ideal
path for spin-off. Regulatory changes are needed to allow MFOs to graduate to
other legal forms as they grow organically. NGOs must be permitted to invest in
the equity of MFOs, as is the case in Bolivia and Africa. Norms for setting up
MFOs under current legal forms should not be eased. Regulations should ensure
that they help genuine MFOs and not others masquerading as MFOs.

M

icrofinance in India started in the early 1980s with
small efforts at forming informal self-help groups
(SHG) to provide access to much-needed savings and
credit services. From this small beginning, the microfinance sector
has grown significantly in the past decades. National bodies like
the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and the
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
(NABARD) are devoting significant time and financial resources to
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microfinance. This points to the growing importance of the sector.
The strength of the microfinance organizations (MFOs) in India is
in the diversity of approaches and forms that have evolved over
time. In addition to the home-grown models of SHGs and mutually aided cooperative societies (MACS), the country has learned
from other microfinance experiments across the world, particularly
those in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand, and Bolivia, in terms of
delivery of microfinancial services. Indian organizations could also
learn from the transformation experiences of these microfinance
initiatives. This paper examines transformation in the Indian context.

Understanding Microfinance
Robinson (2001) defines microfinance as “small-scale financial
services—primarily credit and savings—provided to people who
farm, fish or herd” and adds that it “refers to all types of financial
services provided to low-income households and enterprises.”
In India, microfinance is generally understood but not clearly
defined. For instance, if an SHG gives a loan for an economic
activity, it is seen as microfinance. But if a commercial bank gives
a similar loan, it is unlikely that it would be treated as microfinance. In the Indian context there are some value attributes of
microfinance:
1. Microfinance is an activity undertaken by the alternate
sector (NGOs). Therefore, a loan given by a market
intermediary to a small borrower is not seen as microfinance. However when an NGO gives a similar loan it is
treated as microfinance. It is assumed that microfinance is
given with a laudable intention and has institutional and
nonexploitative connotations. Therefore, we define microfinance not by form but by the intent of the lender.
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2. Second, microfinance is something done predominantly
with the poor. Banks usually do not qualify to be MFOs
because they do not predominantly cater to the poor.
However, there is ambivalence about the regional rural
banks (RRBs) and the new local area banks (LABs).
3. Third, microfinance grows out of developmental roots.
This can be termed the “alternative commercial sector.”
MFOs classified under this head are promoted by the
alternative sector and target the poor. However these
MFOs need not necessarily be developmental in incorporation. There are MFOs that are offshoots of NGOs
and are run commercially. There are commercial MFOs
promoted by people who have developmental credentials.
We do not find commercial organizations having “microfinance business.”
4. Last, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has defined microfinance by specifying criteria for exempting MFOs from
its registration guidelines. This definition is limited to
not-for-profit companies and only two MFOs in India
qualify to be classified as microfinance companies.

Microfinance in India
In India, microfinance is done by organizations having diverse
orientations, as shown in Figure 1.
NGOs in India perform a range of developmental activities;
microfinance usually is a sub-component. Some of these NGOs
organize groups and link them to an existing provider of financial
services. In some cases NGOs have a “revolving fund” that is used
for lending. But in either of these cases, microfinance is not a core
activity for these NGOs. An example is the Aga Khan Rural
Support Programme India (AKRSP-I). For AKRSP-I, the microfinance component is incidental to its work in natural resource
management.
Examples like MYRADA and the Self-Employed Women’s
Association (SEWA) fall in the same category. However, as their
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Figure 1. Defining the microfinance egg
Overall objectives of the
NGO include welfare
activities, economic activities.
Example: Lupin—Health, Education,
Agriculture, and Microfinance
Spin-off microfinance
units: MYRADA υ
Sanghamithra Rural
and Urban

Spin-off: SEWA υ
Sewa Bank—
Urban and Rural

Overall objective of the MFO is
predominantly economic activities.
Example: SIFFS—Economic
activities for fishfolk, microfinance
services are also provided

Exclusive microfinance
institutions. Commercial
funding for lending
operations

Sustainability oriented:
BASIX

Poverty focused:
SHARE/CFTS

Developmental funding for capacity building;
some initial capital for pump priming

Other sources of funding for
nonmicrofinance economic
activities
Other sources of funding for
welfare activities

microfinance portfolios grew, both organizations decided to form
separate entities for microfinance. MYRADA set up an MFO
called Sanghamitra Rural Financial Services (SRFS), while SEWA
set up the SEWA Cooperative Bank.
At the next level, we find NGOs helping the poor in economic
activities. Their purpose is developmental. They see microfinance
as an activity that feeds into economic activities. For instance, the
South Indian Federation of Fishermen’s Societies (SIFFS) started as
a support organization for fishermen, providing technical and marketing support. It then arranged for loans to its members through
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banks. When the arrangement was not effective, it started providing loans itself.
At the third level, we have organizations with microfinance at
the core. They have developmental roots, but are diverse in their
operational details, orientation, and form of incorporation.
This paper focuses on organizations that have microfinance at
the core. It also examines NGOs that have created new MFOs to
deal with the specialized function of microfinance. It deals with
issues of transformation of these organizations, moving from a
developmental root to a commercial sprout.

Issues That Trigger Transformation
We examine five significant issues that trigger the transformation
of NGOs into MFOs.

Size
The most significant issue that triggers a transformation is growth.
This affects the promoters as well as the providers of microfinance.1
With organizations like MYRADA and SIFFS that promoted credit
groups, banks were unwilling to provide loans at the pace at which
microfinance customers needed them. It was not easy for
MYRADA or SIFFS to deal with the attitudes of people manning
these organizations. In several instances it was an enthusiastic bank
manager who made the difference; but this was not institutionalized. In such situations, NGOs tend to get into action by opening
a microfinance division or by setting up a separate MFO. The origins of several Indian MFOs are rooted in the failure of banks to
meet the needs of the poor.
Diversity
Another trigger for transformation is the diversity of financial services that an MFO wants to offer. In most cases, NGOs start with
credit but soon realize the need to provide other support services.
While MFOs have reduced their own lending risks through group
guarantees and addressed the issue of willful default, they have not
been able to grapple with the situation where the underlying economic activity fails and the borrower faces a genuine problem. This
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can be tackled with a combination of savings and risk mitigation
products. But, MFOs realize that the NGO format is not suited ro
carrying out these activities, owing to stringent regulations. They
necessarily have to look at transformation options.

Sustainability
Sustainability is closely linked to growth. Beyond a certain level,
MFOs have to seek external funds for keeping the credit activity
going. When MFOs seek funds from financial institutions, issues
like ownership structure and capital adequacy become critical. For
an MFO to survive in the long run, it has to transform itself into
an institution with transparent systems and accountability. In most
cases the promoters of MFOs do not have sufficient capital to
invest and therefore the main constraint is that they are dealing
with “other people’s money.” NGOs have no clear-cut ownership
structure, and making people liable under this format is a problem.
If they wish to be sustainable, the only option is to deal with mainstream institutions (Rhyne, 2001).
Focus
NGOs need to maintain focus on their original mandate.
Undertaking microfinance is transaction intensive and requires
distinct orientation and skills. For NGOs, there is always a conflict between microfinance, which earns returns and is therefore
“commercial,” and other activities that are “developmental.” This
is one reason for NGOs to spin off their microfinance activities.
The entity that emerges to carry out microfinance should be
understood by the mainstream and therefore it should have an
appropriate institutional form.
Taxation
When an NGO carries out commercial activities (microfinance) on
a large scale, it could lose its “tax free” status, and this might jeopardize other activities. Even grants may become taxable. This is a
major concern for NGO-MFOs. This also triggers a search for an
alternative where microfinance could be kept isolated.
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Transformation Experiences: International
Three different approaches to transformation are apparent in the
following three examples. The Bolivian experience indicates transformation of an NGO to an MFO-Bank. In Indonesia, banks have
adopted MFO methods to provide financial services to the poor.
The Bangladesh experience involves the transformation of a project
into a MFO.

Bolivia: Mainstreaming Microfinance
As in many parts of the world, NGOs triggered the microfinance
revolution in Bolivia. The economic turmoil in the mid-1980s
seeded the microfinance initiatives there. The sector grew rapidly
and now Bolivia has an array of MFOs including banks, NGOs,
and Fondos Financieros Privados (FFPs). Among the banks, the
most celebrated is BancoSol, an offshoot of an NGO called
Prodem. Most NGOs operating microfinance programs in Bolivia
tend to become FFPs when they reach a critical stage. Very few get
to the level of full-scale commercial banks like BancoSol. Prodem,
while it promoted BancoSol, also continued as an NGO to address
the developmental needs of its rural customers. Recently Prodem
converted itself into an FFP. Apart from BancoSol, another
Bolivian bank that has a significant microfinance portfolio is a relatively young one, Banco Economico (Rhyne, 2001).
FFP is an innovative institutional structure for microfinance,
as it allows NGOs to take an equity position in a commercial activity. The Indian microfinance sector has been arguing for policy
reforms on the lines of FFP. For instance, Sa-Dhan, the association
of community development finance institutions, argues that there
should be a new category of companies with a lower level of
capitalization and providing a limited range of banking services
(Sa-Dhan, 2002). Sa-Dhan argues that such companies could limit
their savings services to borrowers. This is similar to the FFPs of
Bolivia, which have lower capital requirements and are restricted
from providing certain services that banks provide. In Bolivia,
many large NGOs have converted themselves to FFPs. In addition,
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there were organizations such as Fassil and Acceso that came from
the commercial world. While Fassil survived, Acceso quickly closed
shop as it went overboard on consumer credit. Accesso’s collapse
has lessons for evolving regulatory norms to suit the MFO needs
and has implications for future entrants to the market.
Gabriel Schor (quoted in Rhyne, 2001) says that this transformation in Bolivia has revealed the concept of an “ideal capitalist.”
It brought four key elements to the ownership of MFOs: NGOs
came in through developmental mission; private investors who
came in were motivated by recognition with returns; public sector
investors came for safe investment and prestige; and international
technical partners came to disseminate the best practices (Rhyne,
2001).

Indonesia: Transformation of the Mainstream
While most microfinance initiatives worldwide have taken the
“supply” route, in Indonesia, the initiative took the “demand”
route. It is, therefore, useful to understand this perspective.
In Indonesia, microfinance did not begin from organizing people
into groups and training them. Neither did it emerge from selfhelp groups. The pioneering institutions in microfinance did not
have any of the value attributes discussed earlier. Of the two most
well known institutions, Bank Dagang Bali (BDB) was established
in 1970 as a private bank. The promoters of BDB were two enterprising people with first-hand experience of small enterprise and
finance (M-Cril, 2002). The bank grew and survived through
innovation of products, seizing the opportunity for arbitrage
between low interest on savings and high interest on loans.
BDB became a model for the state-owned Bank Rakyat
Indonesia (BRI). It set the mainstream to move downwards
towards the poor. The move was to provide banking and not just
credit or savings to the poor. The trigger provided by BDB attained
nationwide coverage in 1984 with the restructuring of the unit
desa (local banking) system of the state-owned BRI (Wardhana,
2001).
This has lessons for embedding microfinance in the general
financial system. Under the old system the state channeled
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resources for the poor through the banking system, offering a line
of credit at subsidized interest. However, the banking system soon
realized that this was not sustainable. The state accepted the challenge to move from subsidized credit to sustainable microbanking.
By moving towards the packaging of credit to meet the needs of the
poor, the system sorted out problems of arbitrage between the cost
of credit available from the institutions that were sponsored by the
state and the local players. The problem of improper identification
of the “beneficiary” leading to leakage was solved. The question of
continuing access to the services was, therefore, successfully
addressed by embracing microfinance methods. After a conscious
shift towards microbanking, the banks now offer complete financial services to the poor and people who transact in small amounts.

Bangladesh: Transformation of a Project
The Bangladesh experience is widely discussed and well quoted in
the literature on microfinance. Here there are no issues pertaining
to transformation, because microfinance did not branch out from
developmental activities, but was a core. Microfinance emerged in
response to the inability of commercial banks, the Bangladesh
Krishi Bank, and other financial institutions to meet the banking
needs of the poor. In the 1970s loan recovery of these institutions
averaged 65% of the dues. During that period, political parties
offered to waive the loans of the farmers (Montgomery,
Bhattacharya, & Hulme, 1996). Around this time, Professor Yunus
started action research on effective delivery of credit to rural
poor—which later grew into a large microcredit program, known as
the Grameen Bank. The program was successful, and in 1983 the
project was converted to an independent bank through legislation.
Unlike the experiences of other countries, the Bangladesh
experience looks at legitimizing a successful experiment and not
allowing it to drift into other forms of inappropriate incorporation. The Bangladesh experiment gained overall approval in as
much as it has become a universal standard in microfinance. This
is one of the most replicated models of microfinance in the world.
Following Grameen, other institutions in Bangladesh also
entered the field. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
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(BRAC), set up in 1970, got into organizing groups under two
pilot programs in the first half of the 1980s. BRAC’s methodology
shared similarities with Grameen. With Grameen being a worldwide fable, it was not difficult for other institutions in Bangladesh
to get regulatory support. BRAC eventually did spin off a banking
company in 2001. In the case of the Association for Social
Advancement (ASA), the metamorphosis was even more stark.
Though ASA was established in 1978 as an organization of social
and political activists, it changed its focus to social and economic
upliftment of the poor in 1985. By 1991 it was a fully focused
organization using microfinance as a singular tool for achieving its
objectives (www.asabd.org).
However, with institutions like Grameen Bank, BRAC, and
ASA pioneering microfinance and providing models for other
countries to follow, microfinance organizations in Bangladesh did
not have a need to transform. They could grow at their own pace
without transformation. One reason why they had no regulatory
problems was that they were focused exclusively on credit. It was
only after they reached a very large size and sophistication that
they wanted to offer other banking services. It was only recently
that Professor Yunus of Grameen Bank raised the issue of the need
for an appropriate legislation for microfinance banks (Yunus,
2003). In Bangladesh we have a dual example of something that
started off as an MFO entering other areas of development, and
NGOs following the example of Grameen and launching their own
successful microcredit programs. The transformation was two way.
Unlike Indonesia, MFOs in Bangladesh also carry the value attributes listed earlier in the paper—dealing predominantly with the
poor and having developmental roots.

Transformation Experiences of India
We have reviewed literature pertaining to experiences in the world
to understand the approaches used to get an identity for microfinance. Indian MFOs employ a scattering of similar approaches.
We examine the types of transformation that have taken place in
India and highlight the implications for the growth of the sector.
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We look at the transformation experiences of the Indian microfinance sector from two viewpoints. First we discuss the responses
for the issues raised earlier in the paper. We then discuss the transformation processes of a few Indian MFOs.

Challenges Posed by Issues That Trigger
Transformation
Size
NGOs have multiple developmental objectives and microfinance
meets a subset of these. The microfinance activity is visible and has
scope for rapid growth. However, the incorporation of an NGO as
a not-for-profit entity (trust, public society) is not ideal for lending activities. When the activity is small, it would be possible to
work within this framework, but growth means documentation,
regulation, follow-up, and money management (Sriram, 2002). To
ensure that there is a clear demarcation between the charitable and
commercial activities of an organization, it is necessary to keep
microfinance as a distinct activity or division. Growth needs the
infusion of funds for microfinance operations. A not-for-profit
entity does not help scaling up borrowings or attract investments
from outsiders. Because there is no capital base in an NGO, leveraging is difficult. If microfinance activities form the biggest chunk
of the surplus earning activities of an NGO, taxability of its operations is a concern.
Share illustrates the transformation of an NGO to a non-banking
finance company because of growth in size and focus on financial services. The specifics of this transformation are discussed later.
Diversity
Although diversity is closely linked to size, it need not necessarily
be so. Apart from loans, MFOs would want to offer savings services
to customers. This is an essential service. It is also a source to help
the loaning services grow. Some MFOs also want to offer insurance
and other services. For instance, when SEWA wanted to work with
poor women a few decades ago, an important gap that they saw was
that women did not have savings and products that addressed the
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needs of social security. For meeting these needs it was necessary to
open a bank. In most cases the first step in diversity is offering savings services. Unlike microcredit which is not as closely regulated,
savings is very closely regulated and monitored. Not all forms of
organizations are permitted to offer savings products. Therefore
any foray into savings will trigger an NGO to examine options of
transformation.

Sustainability
The trigger for sustainability could come from within or from outside. For instance, donors may be prime movers by granting seed
money. However, they may want the activity to be ongoing without further investments. In the case of BASIX in India, the Sir
Ratan Tata Trust (SRTT) was willing to extend a returnable grant
for BASIX for a year to start pilot operations, with an understanding that the grant would not be renewed or enhanced. BASIX
started its operations as an NGO, pilot tested some products and
delivery channels, and in the meantime got the commercial arm
incorporated. The operations, which were field-tested, could be
carried out in a sustainable manner. There are donors who grant
revolving funds for starting microfinance activities. However, if the
activities were to continue, a transformation would be necessary.
Focus
Some NGOs have an exclusive entity to manage microfinance.
NGOs may want to continue other activities and microfinance diffuses the focus. There are two instances of such a spin-off in the
Indian context. The first is SEWA Bank set up by SEWA. The bank
focused on financial services and provided a diverse range of financial services—savings, risk management, and credit. As its insurance portfolio grew, the bank recognized that this was a specialized
function. It has decided to offer risk products through a new organization, Vimo Sewa.
Another instance is the setting up of the Sanghamithra Rural
Financial Services (SRFS) by MYRADA to address the needs of the
self-help groups promoted by it. Before SRFS, MYRADA was
donning the role of a “promoter” of microfinance, i.e., facilitating
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credit through promoting and linking groups with banks. When it
realized that the linking of the groups with banks was not happening at the planned pace, it decided to assume the role of a
“provider.” This involved specialized systems and procedures and
a change in the orientation of staff members. Besides, MYRADA
also wanted to make SRFS an example that could commercially
provide financial services to the poor. Thus, MYRADA decided to
build an arm’s length relationship between the developmental work
of promotion and the commercial work of the provision of credit
related services. It can be seen in this case that one of the subprocesses of transformation is spin-off of new organizations.

Transformation of Institutions
The transformation process in India is still at a nascent stage.
Microfinance has not grown to the size that warrants a full-scale
study on the transformation processes. There are a large number of
small initiatives being carried out at various places. The estimated
number of microfinance institutions that have requested finances
from SIDBI; have contracted rating agencies like M-Cril, Planet
Finance, and CRISIL for rating; or are MACS promoted by the
Co-operative Development Foundation (CDF) are indicated in
Table 1.
The figures are only indicative. The number of public societies
and trusts is likely to be an underestimate, whereas the figures for
other forms are more realistic. We discuss the transformation
options under each regulatory category.

Option 1: In Good Company
If we treat setting up “for-profit companies” to mean transformation, not much has happened in the field. We examine a few
examples of transformation from the limited experiences that the
Indian microfinance sector has had.
Let us look at instances of MFOs that have registered as
NBFCs. Here, there are two approaches: one taken by Share and
Cashpor Financial and Technical Services (CFTS), and the other
by BASIX.
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Table 1. Estimated number of MFI under different organizational forms
Legal Status

Estimated
Number

Not-for-Profit Company
For-Profit Company (NBFC)

2
6

Local Area Banks
Cooperatives:
Coop Society

1

Cooperative bank
Mutually Aided
Cooperative Society

6
1
250

Public Society/Trust a

400

Estimated Number

666

Important Institutions
IASC, Sanghamithra
Samruddhi, SHARE Microfin,
CFTS, Sarvodaya Nano Finance,
Kosh, Asmitha
KBS Lab, Andhra Pradesh
AMCCS, JMSSM, Bhuttico, VYCCU,
ICNW, Pushtikar, Samiti
SEWA Bank
SWDMACTS, Sneha MACS,
PWDMACS, APDSFLMACS, Share
India MACS and others including
mens’ and womens’ thrift co-ops
promoted by CDF—All in Andhra
Pradesh
Assist, SKS, RASS, ASA, FWWB,
GDS, Outreach, RGVN, SIFFS, WWF,
VWS, YCO.

Note. From SFMC Database, M-Cril Database, C-Gap Rating Fund Database, and
CDF Annual Report.
a. From Sinha, S. (2001). (This is one of the estimates.)

Share and CFTS are similar in orientation and focus. Both are
inspired by Grameen and focus on reaching the poorest. Share
operated as a public society for a long time before setting up a
NBFC. CFTS started as an NBFC and is still trying to grapple
with the norms applicable to NBFCs. When Share set up an
NBFC, it transferred a portion of grants received from C-Gap to
poor customers and encouraged them to reinvest those grants as
equity in the new NBFC. This ensured adequate capital for Share
to start an NBFC. This was similar to the Bolivian approach.
However, an important difference is that it was possible for
the Bolivian NGO to invest in an FFP (a similar arrangement was
with K-Rep, Kenya). In the case of Share, it had to transfer all
the clients to a new legal entity, slowly and gradually winding
down the operations in the NGO and transferring the clients to
the NBFC branch by branch (Sriram, 2001). This posed some
problems for Share. First, being governed by the prudential norms,
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an NBFC is prohibited from accepting savings till it gets an investment grade rating. Even if Share gets the rating, its flexibility of
offering savings services to clients will be very restricted. Share
found an innovative solution where it also promoted a cooperative
(Share India MACS) to collect savings. This cooperative in turn
would lend to the NBFC. But this has limitations, as both entities
are incorporated under different laws and have different governance structures.
In the case of CFTS, the incorporation itself was a process
of transformation. Cashpor is an NGO operating in multiple
countries. When CFTS set up its operations in India, it was registered as a company. However, unlike Share it did not have prior
operations in India as an NGO. It was, therefore, difficult to raise
the start-up capital. Local laws make it difficult for small international investments to come in the form of equity in the financial
sector. For a long time, CFTS did not have adequate domestic capital to be registered as an NBFC. CFTS had to go through the
process of raising capital, by finding donor money that could go to
the clients and then be re-invested in the company to reach a size
that gained economies of scale and recognition. The Activists for
Social Alternatives is another organization that follows the
Grameen model and is trying to transform itself as a company. It is
attempting an innovative route of forming private mutual benefit
trusts of clients. The trusts would seek donor grants and in turn
hold equity in the NBFC. However, the scheme has yet to take a
concrete shape.
The path followed by BASIX was different. BASIX had a
design that looked at mainstreaming microfinance right from
inception. The structuring of BASIX was complicated. BASIX
sought a mix of developmental and commercial funding for its
operations and had a separate vehicle through which the operating
entity was adequately capitalized. This involved setting up a holding company that had large external borrowings from donor organizations. The holding company was heavily leveraged. As the
formality of getting clearances for setting up an NBFC was going
on, BASIX carried on its operations for a year through an existing
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NGO-Indian Grameen Services. BASIX represents a mix of developmental capital flowing in on the promise of sustainability and
commercial capital flowing in from the developmental windows of
large financial institutions.
While Share and BASIX have similar institutional investors,
the shareholding in BASIX is not spread as widely as in Share. The
laws have become more stringent since BASIX was established and
it is now impossible to replicate that model of financing.
All three institutions have faced barriers in incorporation and
operation. The major constraints pertain to regulations, as listed
below:
• Steep entry norms to register NBFCs. If the promoters have a
development background, it is difficult for them to raise commercial capital to start an NBFC. Routing donor money into
commercial organizations is not easy, though BASIX did it
with a lot of innovative thinking.
• Restrictions placed on the type of activity that can be undertaken by these companies—especially on accepting savings
from clients and on the financial services that can be provided.
• Restrictions on accessing finance from outside the country.
These restrictions mostly take the form of requiring clearances
and permissions, and they have eased over time. However matters get complicated if domestically raised capital is insufficient.

Option 2: Let Us Cooperate
As debates continue in the microfinance world on issues of mainstreaming, initial capital norms, and incorporation, there is silent
revolution in parts of Andhra Pradesh, particularly in the districts
of Karimnagar and Warangal. There are nearly 250 small thrift
cooperatives, each with an average membership of around 500, carrying on successfully and offering all the services offered by MFOs
for more than a decade. While there are a good number of women’s
cooperatives, there have been an equally large number of men’s
cooperatives, all promoted by CDF.
The microfinance world usually does not recognize traditional
banking or credit union movement as “microfinance,” unless it has
adopted some of the symbolisms. Even by that note, these thrift
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cooperatives qualify to be called MFOs. About a decade ago, CDF
was working exclusively with agricultural finance cooperatives.
State interference in cooperatives was one of the major problems.
The interference culminated in the nation-wide loan pardon
scheme of 1989, resulting in the impairment of the portfolio of
many a cooperative. At that point CDF thought it was time to spin
off the thrift and credit activity out of the cooperative fold and
actively started promoting informal mutual benefit groups.
Simultaneously, CDF also lobbied for a change in legislation, seeking greater autonomy for cooperatives in the state. This culminated
in the Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies (MACS) Act. This
act gives ample autonomy for cooperatives, provided they do not
seek state funding. After the legislation was passed, the mutual
benefit groups promoted by CDF were registered under the new
act. Simultaneously other NGOs encouraged their groups to be
formally registered as MACS.
The transformation of small groups to cooperatives has been
painless. The advantage of a cooperative is that it can access various types of savings from its members besides providing credit like
other MFOs. It can also easily get its stakeholders in the
governance structure by the use of democratic processes. Besides,
cooperatives can grow organically by setting up federations as and
when they have a need to wield clout and negotiate on matters of
policy. However, until now, the federations have played a limited
role in the context of CDF cooperatives.
One major drawback of cooperatives is the geographic limitation. State and not federal legislation governs cooperation, and
even within that, usually the area of operations of a cooperative is
demarcated. Cooperatives also experience problems in accessing
mainstream finance, because of their poor image. Nevertheless,
they seem to be a good mechanism to get the informal groups into
a formal incorporation when the groups reach the limit of size. But
it is also important to note that no single cooperative has grown
big enough to cross Rs. 10 million in outstanding loans.
The success of the new generation of cooperatives is limited to
Andhra Pradesh, even though other states have passed similar
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legislation. The only exception to this is the SEWA Cooperative
Bank based in Ahmedabad. SEWA Bank is increasingly being recognized as one of the oldest MFOs in India—having been in existence for over 25 years. While there have been several urban
cooperative banks across the country, none is recognized as an
MFO. SEWA Bank did not go through the pains of transformation, because the moment its parent, SEWA, decided that the poor
women of Ahmedabad needed a financial service institution of
their own, SEWA lost no time in promoting a women’s bank independent of the NGO. SEWA proves the point that if the client
group and geographical focus exist, there is no need to go through
the painful process of starting as an NGO and moving towards
mainstream. However, under current norms, an urban cooperative
bank can only be set up with a start-up capital of Rs. 5 million
(Sinha, 2001). Though this is less than the amount needed for setting up a commercial bank, it is still a steep amount if it were to be
contributed by poor women to run as a self-governed institution.

Option 3: Banking on Innovation
The third alternative is setting up a local area bank (LAB). We have
only one instance that can be classified as “microfinance”—the case
of BASIX. The setting up of this bank was not a transformation
but was part of the design of the BASIX group. BASIX started the
Krishna Bhima Samruddhi LAB (KBSLAB) in 2001 and is the only
instance of how microfinance principles can be adopted by the
banking sector. The entry norms for LABs are more stringent than
for NBFCs. While NBFCs are expected to bring in a start-up
capital of Rs. 20 million, LABs are expected to start with an
initial capital of Rs. 50 million. There are further restrictions on
LABs—they can only operate in a geographical area limited to
three contiguous districts. Every branch of the LAB has to be
opened with the permission and license of the Reserve Bank of
India (RBI). This is stifling. While there is tremendous flexibility
in launching savings products, it comes with inflexibility in expansion and growth. Recently, RBI has decided not to issue further
LAB licenses (Business Line, 2003).
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Other possibilities include RRBs contributing for the promotion of microfinance and setting up cooperative banks. Some RRBs
are doing an excellent job of linking SHGs and thereby bringing
them to the mainstream banking sector. Harper (2002) has studied
the case of a commercial bank active in microfinance. If commercial banks and RRBs do adopt some microfinance methods, it is
possible to replicate the Indonesian experience in India.
The other area where microfinance could happen is in the
cooperative banking sector. Cooperative banks in India have lower
entry norms compared to mainstream banks and LABs (see Table 2
for details). SEWA Bank is one example of how an NGO promoted
a cooperative bank to offer an array of services. However, we do
not have many other examples. A possible reason for the banking
option not gaining popularity is the urban focus. While there are
several cooperative societies in rural areas, banking has been
restricted to the urban sector. However, recently there have been a
series of bankruptcies in urban cooperative banking and therefore
it is likely that there might be regulatory tightening.

Table 2. Entry point norms for urban cooperative banks (other
than unit banks)
Category of Center

Capital (Rs. million) Membership (No.)

A—population over 1.5 million

50

3000

B—population over 1 million but not
exceeding 1.5 million

25

2500

C—population over 0.5 million but not
exceeding 1 million

20

2000

D—population over 0.2 million but not
exceeding 0.5 million

10

1500

E—population not exceeding 0.2 million

5

1000

Entry point capital for LAB
Entry point for Commercial Bank

Rs. 50 million (area of operation
restricted to 3 contiguous districts
Rs. 1,000 million (area of operation
open across the country)

Source: Report of the High Power Committee on Urban Cooperative Banks. RBI Bulletin.
14 January 2002. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India.
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Transformation Options and Their Implications
If we consider the view taken by Robinson (2001) on what should
be treated as MFOs, we will address the issue head on. She has
classified the institutions that are “expected” to operate in the
microfinance realm under the following categories:
• Institutions that provide microcredit but are not permitted to
mobilize savings from the public (most institutions that are
not regulated and publicly supervised)
• Institutions that do well in lending but poorly in mobilizing
savings (such as Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank)
• Institutions that do well in savings but poorly in lending
(India’s RRB and China’s Rural Credit Cooperatives)
• Institutions that fail in both (most microfinance institutions
that provide subsidized credit are permitted to raise public savings, particularly state-owned banks).
Considering this view, microfinance could happen not only by
the transformation of small NGOs into bigger institutions, but
also by the transformation of larger financial institutions embracing the microfinance methodology and microfinance clients.
The options available for transformation within India and their
implications are detailed in Table 3. In brief, we do not have an
optimal route for the transformation of NGOs into mainstream
MFOs. NBFCs that could operate across the country will have to
go through a steep entry hurdle and registration process. LABs have
a double disadvantage of steep entry norms and limited operational
area. This option is also not available with the recent decision of RBI.
With the concerns that most MFOs have for community
involvement and with the existing legislation in India, the obvious
choice for microfinance initiatives is a cooperative. This involves
the clients in governance because of its democratic nature. Even
though cooperatives seem to be an obvious alternative, they are not
so across the country because only a few states have passed liberal
cooperative legislation. Besides, the major disadvantage of cooperatives is their geographic limitations. Further, the cooperative
institutions, owing to historical baggage, do not make glamorous
MFOs. The credit union movement represents more of an individual
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Table 3. Transformation options and their implications
Form

Options

Organizational
incorporation

Implications

NGO

Option 1:
Spin off mF
as a separate
activity

Not for Profit MFI—
a special vehicle only
for purposes of demonstration at scale (SRFS)

Cannot grow beyond a point. While
sustainability can be demonstrated, the
organization will have to be roving—
withdraw from one location and move to
another—or grow organically and gradually.

For-profit Company
(NBFC)—Transfer
clients, investments,
and portfolio
independently (SHARE,
CFTS)

Issue of ownership and control. Initial
capital contribution can come from the
communities. Recapitalization is complex.
Diversification to savings and risk products
is not simple under current regulation.
Even when permitted, the bouquet of
products offered will be limited.

For-profit cooperative
either under the MACS
Act or as a Co-op Bank

Can grow organically, but will have geographical limitations to growth. The
geographic area of operation is demarcated.
However, there is flexibility to offer savings
products. Initial capitalization requirement
is not daunting.

Promote (informal)
Self-Help Groups
(Pradan, Myrada),
encourage them to
form federations
(Dhan Foundation)

Can grow organically. However, scaling up
and infusion of large amounts of external
funds are not simple, as the movement is
scattered across several independent informal or legal entities. Embedding in the
banking system is a solution, but there are
limits to growth. There are chances of
withering away if the NGO withdraws
support.

Promote (formal)
mutually aided
cooperatives and
encourage them to

Problems are similar to SHGs mentioned
above. However, since each of these is an
independent entity, dealing with banking
institutions is likely to be simpler. Chances
of withering away are low if systems are
established.

Promote NBFCs—
seek developmental
and commercial
investments through
complex mechanisms
—private mutual
benefit trusts, debt
in holding company
(CFTS, BASIX)

Problem in raising initial capital. Other limitations applicable to NBFCs discussed
above also apply. It is difficult to pull off a
complex structure of mutual benefit trusts
and holding company structures.

Promote LABs, find
equity for start up

A difficult proposition for two reasons: steep
initial capital requirements and complexity
in licensing procedure of RBI and limitation
in geographical area to three contiguous dis
tricts. Tremendous amount of flexibility in
offering diverse products and services and
great scope for customization.

Option 2:
Promote
independent
MFOs

Development Option 1
Professionals
with NGO
background

Option 2
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banking model in India with formal systems, while microfinance
focuses on groups, social collateral, and social capital.
Few cooperatives use the microfinance methodology in providing
financial services.

Implications for Regualtion
The transformation experiences of NGOs have implications for the
regulatory framework. The microfinance sector represented by
Sa-Dhan has been advocating the easing of entry point capitalization norms for microfinance “companies.”
While this would help a large number of NGOs to hive
[intended word?] off their commercial operations and help operations to grow organically, it does not prevent other individuals or
institutions masquerading as MFOs. The recent experiences of a
series of urban cooperative bank failures in Gujarat and Andhra
Pradesh are an indication of what happens when the easier entry
norm is misused. For instance, the easier entry norm for cooperative banks was introduced because these were democratic institutions, member-owned, and member-driven. However, over a
period of time, all these banks started transacting heavily with
nonmembers. The institutions lost the cooperative nature for
which the entry norms were eased and turned out to be in the
hands of a handful of investors. In proposing regulatory reform, we
need to be wary of the potential misuse of the easing of entry hurdles.
There are also a good number of residuary NBFCs that collect
savings from the poor and the unorganized sector. While these are
closely regulated, their leeway in providing credit is cramped, as
they have to invest a major portion of the savings in safe government securities. Therefore, MFOs have not considered residuary
NBFCs as a viable option. The microfinance sector does not treat
residuary NBFCs as MFOs because they do not have the “value
attributes” discussed earlier.
When entry norms are eased, there may be several other
institutions—without the value attributes—claiming to be MFOs,
and the microfinance sector will encounter a credibility crisis. In
Bolivia, FFPs were seen as an intermediary step for NGOs to enter
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the mainstream. The entry norms were steep, but they allowed an
NGO to invest in a bank or FFP. In this scenario, it is possible for
an NGO to convert the donor money received for pump-priming
as equity in a new and proper banking entity. In the case of K-Rep
in Kenya, the NGO is registered as a company limited by guarantee, and resources are held in a charitable trust that is invested in
the bank. In both cases some norms were relaxed, but the new
institutions were treated as proper financial institutions.
Graduating from an NGO to an NBFC to a LAB to a commercial bank is impossible in India because the laws do not provide
for transformation. It is also not possible because the steps between
these stages are steep. A LAB can never hope to go beyond its area
of operation. It would be useful if MFOs would argue for legislation that would allow them to graduate to bigger institutions—one
on cooperative lines and another on corporate lines.
Another route that the microfinance sector can advocate is to
adhere to the current norms of entry and capitalization for NBFCs
and LABs but seek permission for NGOs to invest in such forprofit entities without prejudice to the tax status of NGOs. This
would mean that only NGOs that can raise enough funds from
various sources could actually set up a mainstream-type NBFC.
This gives no shortcuts for entrants from the non-NGO sector,
since if they have to bring in substantial capital, it does not make
matters simpler if they can adopt the not-for-profit entity route.
After all, they will have to find somebody to put money into the
not-for-profit entity in the first place.

Notes
This paper was presented at the SIDBI workshop on “key Dimensions in
Transformation: From NGOs to Formal Institutions,” at the Indian School of
Business, Hyderabad, December 12–14, 2002. The authors acknowledge the editorial
support provided by Mr. P.S. Seshadri of the Indian Institute of Management,
Ahmedabad.
1 Promoters of microfinance are those who help in the formation of groups,
invest in building the capacities of customers, and link them to a financial institution.
Providers are those who involve themselves in direct financial transactions with
clients. For a good discussion, see Rutherford (2001).
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